This paper introduces a metatheoretical, contingency-based framework of interorganizational network management. This framework links together the discussion on the manageability of networks and extant literature on the functions, tasks, and actor roles in network management. The paper defines and discusses four basic network management functions -labeled tentatively as framing, activating, mobilizing, and synthesizing -that are suggested to be universal to all networks, including strategic nets, markets as networks or macro networks, as well as social networks. It is further suggested that management tasks, derived from the more general management functions and contingent upon the characteristics of the network, differ between different types of networks. Finally, the paper discusses the managerial roles that different actors in a network can adopt depending on their resources and capabilities. In spite of its preliminary nature the paper is seen to make a significant contribution in clarifying the discussion of management in a network context. 
These two polar viewpoints to network management can be attributed to the differences of definitions and ontological views of networks. In other words, the answer to the question about the extent to which a firm can manage a network depends on what background assumptions, and definitions we are willing to accept regarding "networks" and "management" (Harland and Knight, 2001; Möller and Svahn, 2006) . As such these perspectives logically follow from their background assumptions. However, it can be argued that the seemingly contradictory "unmanageability" and "manageability" perspectives are in fact compatible (Ritter, Wilkinson, Johnston, 2004; Möller and Rajala, 2007) . The key issue, we argue, is not whether networks can or cannot be managed but what kind of governance or managerial solutions are most suitable for different types of networks. This viewpoint calls for a contingency type theory of network management. Möller and his colleagues have addressed this challenge concerning the strategic nets and suggest that network management is a function of the level of determination of the value creation system underlying a particular net (Möller, Rajala and Svahn, 2005; Möller and Svahn, 2006; Möller and Rajala, 2007) .
Broadly conceived, network management can be defined as improving the ability of the network to operate towards accomplishing its varying objectives, or as the means by which network members influence each other and/or the network as a whole in order to improve network cooperation. At one level, network management involves restructuring the existing network, and at another level it involves improving the conditions of cooperation within the existing structure (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, 46-53; Klijn, Koppenjan and Termeer, 1995) . The former moderestructuring -involves activities such as adding or removing actors, resources or value activities from the network as well as changing the ways in which the network relates to its environment. The latter mode -improving conditions of cooperation -involves various activities taken to facilitate cooperation between network actors so that the network would accomplish its goals. One should note that this description assumes an existing network. One should also address the issue of network construction, i.e., the development and mobilization of a new strategic net by a particular actor.
To complicate the notion of network management even more one should also take into account that management seems to differ also at different levels of management (Möller and Halinen, 1999; Ritter and Gemunden, 2003) . Yet another issue is that network actors can, in principle, range from individuals to organizations and even to networks (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995) . From this perspective an interesting aspect is to look at what kind of roles actors can take in network management and what factors condition this role taking (Heikkinen et al., 2007; Snow, Miles and Coleman, 1992; Knight and Harland, 2005) .
In sum, although there are many useful conceptualizations of network management, the contributions have remained fairly fragmented. The literature still leaves several important questions unanswered: How are the different conceptualizations connected to each other? What is the basis of what we call "network management"? Facing the different underlying assumptions of various network research traditions, can one develop a unified theory of network management? Or do we need modified theories for different disciplinary schools or for different types of networks? The metatheoretical contingency framework that we create in this paper is an attempt to provide preliminary answers to these questions. Watson (2006, 167) defines the (organizational) management concept broadly as the "overall shaping of relationships, understandings and processes within a work organisation to bring about the completion of the tasks undertaken in the organisation's name in such a way that the organisation continues into the future". Management is thus a function that by definition has to be carried out in every organization that wants to exist in the future. Managerial work is the "activity of bringing about this shaping", and managers are the people who are given the official responsibility for carrying out this work, although the function of management can be carried out also by people not appointed officially as "managers" (Watson 2006, 167-171) .
Management and its contingencies 3.1 General business management
The above definition implies that strategy-making is an inherent part of managerial work, since the management should take the responsibility of completing the tasks "in such a way that the organisation continues into the future". The definition also assumes that the organization has undertaken the completion of some specific tasks. However, it is evident that sometimes these tasks may be neither self-evident nor consciously chosen. In this case, we argue, it falls upon the managers to bring light to the "understandings" on what the tasks indeed are. In other words, it is also upon the function of management to vision and make clear what are the goals and tasks that the organization strives to achieve.
A well-known categorization of five elements of management was introduced by Fayol in 1949 (ref. Watson, 2006, 172-173) . According to Fayol, management consists of planning (devising a plan of action for utilizing the organization's resources to achieve the organization's objective), organizing (making sure that resources are available when needed), commanding (directing people so that they carry out required activities), coordinating (ensuring that all the activities support each other and combine to contribute to the overall fulfillment of the organizational objective), and controlling (checking that activities follow their planned course and correcting and deviations that are found). Since Fayol this account of management functions has remained fairly unchanged, although coordination is often seen as part of the other four functions. It thus seems that virtually all contemporary textbooks of management can be summarized in terms of four functions -planning, organizing, leading, and controlling (Toukas, 1994) . The list may differ somewhat from one textbook to the other, but the essence of the categories remains the same.
The classical definition of management does not, however, embody the full richness of the phenomenon of management. Tsoukas (1994) has identified four major, and in many ways apparently unlinked, research perspectives to management that go beyond the traditional functions: the management functions perspective (including classical, systems and historical schools of management study), the management task characteristics perspective (building on sociological lines of inquiry), the management roles perspective (the famous work by Minzberg (1973)), and the management control perspective (the neo-Marxist approach that looks at the institutional structures of management). We next summarize these perspectives briefly, based mainly on Tsoukas (1994) .
The management functions perspective is based originally on the classical approach, which was already presented above. The systems approach (Daft, 1988; Robbins, 1991; Beer, 1981) has further developed the classical approach. It studies organizational management through the objective organizational requirements for survival and effectiveness, and claims that "certain systemic functions need to be carried out in all organizations, which give rise to certain distinctive management functions" (Tsoukas, 1994, 292) . The historical school (Chandler, 1977; Teulings, 1986) , on the other hand, looks at the functions of management through the historical developments or evolution of organizations. Teulings (1986) , for instance, has identified that in modern large-scale corporations we can identify four management functions: ownership, administration, innovation, and production.
The management task characteristics perspective, which Tsoukas (1994) relates to Whitley (1989) , follows a sociological line of inquiry that seeks to study the distinguishing characteristics of the tasks that managers have to do as well as the management skills that these tasks imply. The nature of these tasks arises from two fundamental premises: first, the organizational nature of management activities, and secondly, the discretionary nature of management in the allocation, control and use of resources. From these premises Whitley (1989) has suggested that the nature of management tasks is that they are highly interdependent and context-dependent, relatively unstandardized, developing and fluid, oriented towards both the maintenance and innovation of administrative structure, and characterized by the lack of visible outputs that can be directly linked to individual inputs. This perspective does not so much look into the content of the tasks, but into their characteristics. We acknowledge the relevance of these inherent characteristics of managerial tasks. However, in this paper we are interested more in the actual content of different management tasks in network management context; and further whether one can identify contingencies that give rise to particular divisions in the required management tasks. Here we take Whitley's analysis as our basis: if the nature of management is context-dependent, then different management tasks (in terms of their differing contents) are required in different organizational contexts having certain contingencies. We will return to these contingencies later when we discuss the task-level contingencies of network management.
In the management roles perspective, Minzberg's (1973) work is especially prominent. He has criticized the functions perspective on management, and especially the classical school, arguing that its universal prescriptions for what managers should do not describe what managers actually do. Minzberg (1973) has indeed shown that the actual management process, or activities, carried out by managers do not often follow the above categorizations. That is, at the micro level of analysis the managers do not seem to follow the classical categorization of managerial work, but are engaged in various managerial roles, falling under three major categories: interpersonal, informational and decisional roles.
Finally, the management control perspective takes on an institutional, macro-level analysis of management, building on the neo-Marxist approach (Armstrong, 1989; Willmott, 1984) . This perspective looks at the institutional structures of managers and those that are managed, and emphasizes "the centrality of management control in securing the transformation of labour power to actual labour in the context of capitalist relations of production" (Tsoukas 1994, 297) . Looking at this perspective from a less critical stance, with lesser focus on control per se and more emphasis on also other causal powers of management, Tsoukas (1994) argues that this perspective is useful in that it conceptualizes the causal powers of management that makes the existence of certain management functions possible. Thus "[by] virtue of being part of the [socio-economic] industrial structure, management is vested with a set of causal powers that defines its nature" (Tsoukas, 1994, 297) . These causal powers are control, the ability to elicit cooperation from others, and the drive towards efficiency and effectiveness (Tsoukas 1994) . One should note this perspective is essentially informed by the critical realist perspective into management and organization theory (Bhaskar, 1978; Bhaskar, 1989; Dobson, 2002; Easton, 2002) . Tsoukas (1994) , based on his review of the organizational management literature, introduces a metatheoretical framework to draw linkages between the different, fragmented approaches to management. He points out that there are apparent tensions between the four different perspectivesthe management functions perspective, the management task characteristics perspective, the management roles perspective, and the management control perspective. These tensions relate, he argues, to their rather dichotomic conceptions of managers either in abstract and universal terms (the function and control perspectives), or through individual managerial activities (the task and role perspectives). Tsoukas (1994) Tsoukas (1994) draws linkages between the different approaches by building a four level framework (see Figure 1 ) of the different approaches to management, with linkages between the levels so that each upper level is made possible by the immediate lower level. Different levels "exhibit different dynamics (i.e. rate of temporal change): the closer to the surface, the more likely it is that changes occur (depending on changes of various contingencies)"; these differences in dynamics are denoted with different shapes of lines in Figure 1 . Tsoukas's view corresponds to the description of social world as a layered system proposed also by Sayer (2000) .
A metatheory of general business management

Figure 1. A metatheory of different perspectives to management (Tsoukas 1994)
The first level of management (TD1; OL1) denotes the theoretical description (TD) and the empirical phenomenon, or the ontological layer (OL), of management roles. Tsoukas (1994, 296) argues that at this level the key contingency question is "what are the contingencies (for example, type of job, hierarchical position, management strategy, type of industry, national features, etc) which are systematically associated with how particular managerial roles emerge, demise or gain im po rtan ce ?" . Th i s i s th e m o st f l uid an d c on te xt-de pe nde n t of al l o f th e l aye rs. B ut w hy are management roles what they are? Tsoukas argues that to answer this question one needs to look for an explanation at a deeper layer of management, in this case the second level.
The second level of management (TD2; OL2) looks at the nature of management tasks, and has the power to explain differences in roles at the first level. For instance, the interdependence of some managerial tasks gives rise to certain managerial roles. In other words, the reasoning behind this analysis is that "for particular management roles to be possible a certain configuration of management task characteristics must be in place" (Tsoukas 1994, 296) . Then why are certain configurations of management tasks characteristics the way they are? Again, to look for the answer, we need to go to a deeper layer.
The third level of management (TD3, OL3) goes into the specific management functions, whose existence is a necessary condition for the existence of a configuration of management task characteristics at the second level. As Tsoukas (1994, 296) explains, "it is by virtue of the fact that managers are organizationally compelled to make a difference to the resources they combine via performing the functions of planning, organizing, leading, controlling, etc that certain characteristics of management tasks are possible".
Finally, in the same vein, the fourth level of management (TD4, OL4), the causal powers of management deriving from the socio-economic context or the national and global industrial and institutional structure of managerial work, gives rise to the management functions, by "locating management into its wider socioeconomic context and conceptualizing the manner in which this context endows management with a set of causal powers (namely, it imparts to management a necessary way of acting)".
At the fourth level, the wider industrial/institutional structure gives management the following three (organizational-level) "causal powers" (Tsoukas 1994 ):
1. T h e a b i l i t y f o r m a n a g e r s t o control an organization through superior-subordinate relationships. 2. The ability for managers to elicit active cooperation from subordinate members through the provision of rewards. 3. The managerial drive, or imperative, towards seeking efficiency and effectiveness, i.e. the "managers are organizationally compelled to 'make a difference' to the resources they manage, so that their integrated utilization generates more value than their separate use" (Tsoukas 1994, 298) .
These three causal powers are inherently related to the fundamental nature of management in market economics, and they are in themselves a contradictory set (e.g. control and cooperation may sometimes be at odds with each other, and seeking efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously may sometimes not be possible). Furthermore, these causal powers can change in strength depending on shifts in societal power relations and other contingent organizational, national or global factors. (Tsoukas 1994) .
The levels TD1, TD2, TD3 and TD4 thus correspond to the four theoretical perspectives (roles, task characteristics, functions, and control, respectively) of management. Each layer constitutes a relatively autonomous area of study, but the framework by Tsoukas causally links them together. The power of the framework is that it lets us understand how the different concepts of management at different levels of analysis can be conceived as a coherent set of "management work".
In this paper, we will adopt the Tsoukas's (1994) framework to analyze the corresponding contingencies and levels of management in networked settings, thus extending Tsoukas's framework from its intra-organizational level of analysis to the inter-organizational level. This is the topic of the next section.
A metatheoretical contingency framework of network management
In this section we will synthesize the discussion of networks and their management on the one hand, and intra-organizational management and its contingencies on the other hand. In order to do this we will first discuss how the two discussions are fundamentally connected to each other through the concept of value-creation. Then, we will continue to integrate the contingency framework by Tsoukas (1994) with ideas on networks and their management. Through this discussion we will present our contingency framework of network management (see Figure 2 ).
We will discuss our framework under four headings, corresponding to the four levels of management (TD1 -TD4) outlined in the framework; however, we will start with fourth level ( TD4) and continue from there upward. 
Basic-level contingencies of management -Level Four
Studies on both network management and intra-organizational management are fundamentally based on the idea of value creation. To start with, any value-creating system (including hierarchies, markets and networks) can always be defined as a set of actors, resources and activities (the ARA model, see Håkansson and Johansson, 1992; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Parolini, 1999) . Within this definition, actors are those who perform activities and control resources, and activities are the usage of resources to change other resources. Value is thus created through the interplay of the activities, actors and resources, and it is possible to observe this at any level of analysis, including intra-and inter-organizational settings.
In these terms, value may be perceived through the benefits and sacrifices incurred in a system (Flint, Woodruff and Gardial, 1997; Eggert, Ulaga and Schultz, 2006; Ulaga, 2003; Möller, 2006) . Thus, value can be determined as the (desired or actual) benefits received by an actor minus (perceived or actual) sacrifices that went into producing and/or receiving the benefits. Within this definition of value, effectiveness improves along with the increase of benefits, all other things being equal, and efficiency improves along with the reduction of sacrifices, all other things being equal.
This brings us back to the very basis of the contingency framework by Tsoukas (1994) . As it has been discussed, intra-organizational management is, at its very core, fundamentally based on the drive to improve effectiveness and efficiency; in other words the fundamental drive of management is to improve value-creation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . We argue that this is true in any valuecreation system, including also networks, not merely intra-organizational settings, insofar as managerial action is directed to understanding and developing value-creation at a network level of organizing. Therefore, along the lines of the framework by Tsoukas, we argue that at the basic level of the framework (level TD4; OL4), our socio-economic industrial and institutional context drives network managers towards improving value-creation by seeking improved effectiveness and efficiency.
In addition to efficiency and effectiveness, Tsoukas argues that the other two basic causal powers of management are that managers are endowed with the ability to control and elicit active cooperation. This is where we need to be clear when we link intra-organizational management to inter-organizational management. We propose that when the terms are defined in their broadest or their most abstract sense, controlling and eliciting cooperation are the most fundamental abilities of management not only to hierarchies, but also to networks and market-based organizing. Tsoukas (1994) defines control and cooperation in terms of superior-subordinate relations, but in networks and markets there are no such authorial relations but relations between autonomous actors. Hence for networks and markets we need to look more closely at the concepts of control and cooperation. Among superiors-subordinates, control can be authorial and cooperation induced with rewards. In network relationships power and authority may be relevant to control as well, although not based on superior-subordinate relations but based on for example differences between actors' resources and competences. Likewise, both cooperation and control in networks may also be induced with rewards. Further, it has been shown that in networks control may also be based on for example "reputational control" (Kenis and Provan, 2006) and cooperation may be based on trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) . In market-based, transactional relationships both control and cooperation may be defined through price-based contracting (Powell, 1990) . In sum, we argue that control and cooperation in their broadest sense are the most fundamental capacities of management not only for hierarchies, but also for networks and markets. These capacities or causal powers are fundamentally based on the socio-economics industrial and institutional context we live in.
There are, however, contingencies which augment or reduce the ability of managers to control and elicit active cooperation in different intra-and inter-organizational settings. Utilizing the framework by Tsoukas, we argue that there are distinct, interrelated levels of such contingencies (TD1-TD3) above the basic level of causal powers (TD4). The function-level contingencies belonging to the third level (TD3) of the framework are the subject of the next section.
Function-level contingencies: markets, hierarchies and networks -Level Three
It has been well documented that different contexts require or endow different governance modes (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997; Powell, 1990) . As pointed out the three fundamental modes of governance are hierarchies, markets, and networks (Adler, 2001; Powell, 1990) . In an ideal representation of these, hierarchical governance is based on authority, markets are based on governance through pricing, and network cooperation is based on trust. Naturally, these ideal modes may perhaps never exist in their purest forms. In reality we will witness mixed or hybrid modes, with different degrees of hierarchy-, market-and network-like organizing (see e.g., Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Powell, 1990) .
There are certain contingencies that determine which of the three governance modes functions best in a certain situation. For instance, Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) argue that demand uncertainty, task complexity, human asset specificity, and frequency lead to structural embeddedness among actors, which calls for a network form of governance as opposed to hierarchical or market-based governance. Similarly, Park (1996) , based on transaction cost economics, argues that differences in actor autonomy, task complexity, opportunistic threat, and bureaucratic costs condition the type of governance. Within the network form of governance, there exist in fact different sub-types of governance; for instance Park (1996) identifies four network governance modes each suitable to specific contingent contexts: mutual adjustment, alliance, voluntary-trilateral, and mandatory-trilateral governance. Although Park's suggestion is useful, we feel that the tasks or goals that the network aims to achieve, and especially the underlying system through which it attempts to do this and produce value, are more fundamental. The task and the related value system are assumed to influence both the type of member interdependence and the effective 'governance form', not vice versa (Möller and Svahn, 2003) .
Along these lines we argue that there are specific contingencies (which we will call functionlevel contingencies to keep the terminology straightforward) that determine which type of governance is the most suitable in a specific setting or context. In reality it may be that any specific situation may allow different types of governance, or mixed types governance, but the general argument nevertheless stands that there are specific function-level contingencies that give rise to specific governance modes.
We further argue, based on the framework by Tsoukas (1994) , that in each specific type of governance managers are endowed with, or required to take on, distinct types of management functions. In hierarchical settings these management functions can be summarized as planning, organizing, leading, and controlling (Tsoukas 1994) . These functions are central, because they constitute the required management work that organizations need in order to (1) know where to go and how to go there (planning), (2) to build the structures, resources and coordination it needs to get where it wants to go (organizing), (3) to direct and energize people to carry out needed activities (leading), and (4) to follow-up that the organization ultimately achieves its established goals (controlling). (Note that the word "controlling" is used here differently from the level TD4.) Thus, these functions answer to the question what do managers need to do in order to "bring about the completion of the tasks undertaken in the organisation's name in such a way that the organisation continues into the future" (Watson 2006) .
We can describe the four key functions described above more generally also in terms of a value-creation system: Managing a value-creation system requires (1) that actors in the system know wh at v al ue the sy ste m targ e ts to m ake and h ow i t c an bri n g abo ut th i s v al ue ( pl ann ing ) , ( 2) structuring and coordinating resources and activities to bring about the value (organizing), (3) directing and energizing actors to carry out the value-creating activities (leading), (4) and checking that the value is indeed created as planned (controlling).
Intra-and inter-organizational forms of organizing are fundamentally analogous in the sense that both are value-creation systems, consisting of actors, resources and activities, as we have argued. Through this basic analogy we can extend the four key managerial requirements from the interorganizational level to the inter-organizational level. In other words, the argument made here is that in any value-creating system, including hierarchies, networks and market-based organizing, there are certain fundamental requirements for managerial work, which are then manifested as certain managerial functions, without which the system will not be able to create value successfully. In other words, analogous to the argument by Tsoukas (1994) , the requirements for management are the same for all value-creating systems (these requirements derive from level TD4), but the manifestation of them as management functions may differ between different systems (that is, between hierarchies, markets, and networks), dependent on their differing contingencies (at level TD3).
The required management functions in market-type organizing that correspond to planning, organizing, leading, and controlling, could be labeled as "designing" (planning the structures and processes that are able to create a targeted value), "tendering/bidding" (the processes of transactional relationships that make it possible to organize price-based market systems), and "controlling" (the processes of ensuring that value is created according to the original design). However, in this paper market-based forms of organizing are out of the scope of our analysis.
In the same way as in hierarchical value-creating systems, also in networked value-creating systems the key requirements of management is to ensure that:
1. The value-creating system targets to create some value (at least at some level of the system) and identifies how the system can bring about this value; these targets then need to be made known to (at least some of the) actors within the system. 2. Required actors, resources and activities are structured, recruited and coordinated to bring about the value that is targeted. 3. The actors are mobilized and energized so that they carry out the needed value-creating activities. 4. It gets checked that the value that the system targets is indeed created, and if not, that corrective measures to improve action within the system are taken.
We thus argue that without these basic requirements of managerial work, neither hierarchical nor networked value-creating systems will produce any value. We do not propose that all networks do or even should have an explicit unified purpose, or a unified and consciously set view of the targeted value, but we argue that at least at some level of organizing within any value-creating system has to exist at least between two actors, so that there is at least some mutual idea of what kind of value they are targeting to work on together. For if there would not be any such mutual idea, then there would not be any possibility of cooperation; thus no hierarchies and networks would exist.
However, because network relationships are based on relationships among relatively autonomous units, unlike hierarchies, the four fundamental requirements of management cannot be carried out in networks through hierarchical functions such as "planning", "organizing", "leading" and "controlling". The industrial network perspective has indeed well shown how any single firm has only limited control over the network(s) it participates (see e.g. Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ford and Håkansson, 2006) . The fundamental point is that no organization can fully control or manage its resources in isolation, since part of the resources available to a firm are under the direct control of other actors in the network and can only be controlled or managed through the medium of interactive relationships between the actors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Ford and Håkansson, 2006) . Therefore, although the basic requirements for management in networked value-creating s y s t e m s a r e t h e s a m e a s i n h i e r a r c h i c a l v a l u e -c r e a t i n g s y s t e m s , w e n e e d t o r e d e f i n e o u r understanding of the key management functions in networked settings. Despite the differences, since hierarchies and networks are based on the same fundamental requirements for managing valuecreation, the basic functions of management in networks are also analogous among them. We thus propose that in contexts of network governance, through an understanding of the nature of networks, the intra-organizational management functions may be re-conceived in networked settings through a comparison of management functions in hierarchies and networks.
We tentatively suggest that basic network management functions could be labeled as framing, activating, mobilizing, and synthesizing. These concepts or labels are not new; they have been used for instance by Agranoff and McGuire (2001) , and further developed by McGuire (2002 McGuire ( , 2006 . Agranoff and McGuire used these concepts to discuss the similarities and differences in the functions of hierarchical and network management. It may well be that it would be sufficient to keep with the conventional labels of management (planning, organizing, leading, and controlling) and merely redefine these to fit the network context. However, we will tentatively introduce this new terminology in this paper in order to emphasize that network management functions are somewhat different from hierarchical management functions in their nature. Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 298-300) define framing as involving "establishing and influencing the operating rules of the network", "influencing its [the network's] prevailing values and norms", and "altering the perceptions of the network participants". Activating, in turn, "includes the process of identifying participants for the network… and stakeholders in the network… as well as tapping the skills, knowledge, and resources of these persons." Mobilizing involves inducing "individuals to make a commitment to the joint undertaking -and to keep that commitment", or briefly "motivating, inspiring, inducing commitment". Finally, synthesizing involves "creating the environment and enhancing the conditions for favorable, productive interaction among network participants" and "preventing, minimizing, or removing blockages to cooperation". These four network management functions resemble the hierarchical management functions of planning, organizing, leading and controlling, respectively. However, the basic difference between framing and planning, activating and organizing, mobilizing and leading, and finally synthesizing and controlling, is that network management incorporates constant negotiation and re-negotiation among a group of autonomous actors, while hierarchical management is more direct and authoritybased.
To sum up, we argue that based on the fundamental managerial requirements of valuecreation systems, the four network management functions described above are critical to the success of all kinds of networks; whether extensive or limited in size, strategic or emergent. However, we contain that there is no generic "network management". The way these management functions are manifested as management tasks in different types of networks is contingent upon several factors, relating to the characteristics of the particular network. For instance, management tasks can be expected to differ in networks that have several equal partners to those that have only one or two key players and several smaller actors, in networks with clear and unclear network pictures, and in stable, renewal and innovation networks. These contingencies are the topic of the next section.
Task-level contingencies: characteristics of the network -Level two
Management functions, the level three in the Tsoukas's framework, are the basic building blocks of management in all networks. There are, however, certain contingencies that influence the required management tasks at level two. Different types of networks are argued to require different compositions of management tasks. The contingent factors that determine the needed managerial tasks relate ultimately to the characteristics of the network; its structural patterns, how it is related to its environment, and what type of value-creation it pursues. Based on our literature review, we argue that some of the most important such contingencies are: (1) the distribution of power in the network, (2) the clarity of the network "picture", (3) the level or degree of strategic intent in the network, (4) and, fundamentally, the type of the network's underlying value creation logic. The last contingency is most fundamental as it influences, through the inherent characteristics of the goals and the required tasks to pursue these, the other postulated contingencies (Möller and Svahn, 2006) .
The distribution of power in a network differs from one network to the other, and this influences the way the network can be managed (Wilkinson, 1973; Boyle and Dwyer, 1995) . Some networks consist of more equal-sized players, with more or less equal power of influence over the other players. In such networks the four network management functions must often manifest as more or less subtly negotiated management tasks. However, in networks that have a powerful hub company, the power-position driven for example by the company's superior resource-base, and several smaller-sized followers, the hub may well adopt a more power-driven, hierarchical-type managing style. In this case it may well be that the management style of the network resembles close to a "planning, organizing, leading, and controlling" type of management, with the hub company taking a superior role and the other going into a sub-ordinate role, despite the fact that the subordinates here are still (ownership-wise) autonomous.
The clarity of the network picture -or cognitive frame in more theoretical terms -in the network refers to how well the actors in the network are, individually and/or collectively, able to make sense the current, potential, and future patterns of their immediate network and how the network is connected to its environment (Ford et al., 2003, Öberg, Henneberg and Mouzas, 2007; Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002; Henneberg, Mouzas and Naudé, 2006) . When the network picture is reasonably well formed, the network members are likely to need less managerial effort to negotiate the framing of the network and more managerial effort can be invested in activating, mobilizing and synthesizing the network. Conversely, the more ambiguous the picture is, the more managerial effort is needed in framing the cooperation.
The degree of strategic intent relates to the manageability of networks in general. Some networks are, at the network level, based on more emergent cooperation whereas some networks are based on a more consciously set strategic intent. The INA perspective on network studies the former, whereas the strategic or value networks (or "nets") perspective studies the latter (Möller and Svahn, 2003; Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston, 2004) . The argument is that emergent networks cannot be managed at the network level, whereas strategic networks are by definition managed. Our position here is rather pragmatic; based on our earlier position that all networks require certain management functions, we argue that all networks can -and actually have to be -managed at least to some extent, and this varies from a low degree of manageability to a higher degree. This perspective has earlier been suggested for instance by Harland and Knight (2001) and Möller, Rajala and Svahn (2005) . From this pragmatic perspective, there exists "some degree of mutual interdependence [within the network] such that each party has some ability to influence the other" (Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston, 2004, 177) . The role of an individual member firm is to operate "as one of many having an influence on the structure and functioning of the network" (Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston, 2004, 178) . Naturally, the more emergent the network is, the less it is intentionally managed. But still also emergent networks are managed, we argue, at least at the level of micro-level of interactive activities. Möller and Rajala (2007) , for example, provide several examples of actors that try to influence the formation of a new network, such as the Bluetooth coalition and the current Blue-Ray coalition.
In this respect the level of strategic intent does not have to be directly connected with the character of the network. High strategic intent can be identified both in broad emergent networks and in more closed strategic nets. Its probability is, however, much higher in the latter type of networks. Moreover, the managerial tasks can be expected to vary a great extent between these different network contexts; see for example Möller and Rajala (2007) . The degree of strategic intent is seen to be related also to the other task-level contingencies already discussed: networks having one or few strong players are more likely to set clearer strategies based on the strategy/strategies of these strong players; and networks able to vision their network pictures more clearly are more likely to be able to also construct mutual strategic intent.
Here we argue, again, that the basic managerial functions are in principle the same both in emergent and strategic networks, but the tasks of management may be different. In emergent networks the tasks of management are defined more by constant, on-going negotiation and renegotiation, adaptations and re-adaptations, than in strategic nets. Further, in emergent networks there are more likely than in strategic nets to simultaneously exist multiple different and even contradictory ideas and formulations of the vision and structure of the network, thus necessitating different patterns of management tasks.
Finally, the type of value creation is related to the value-creation type of the network. This view is put forward especially by Möller, Rajala and Svahn (2005) , Möller and Svahn (2003) , and Möller and Rajala (2007) , who formulate and discuss a theory-driven framework for classifying different types of networks and their management. Referring to notions of value-creating systems (e.g. Parolini, 1999) , they argue that the underlying characteristics of the value system and its level of determination provide a key to an understanding of different business networks and the managerial capabilities they require. The level of determination is essentially related to the kind of knowledge actors have about the resources, activities and actors forming the value-system; as such it is an ontological condition of the networks and informs also the ways of knowing, or epistemology, about the network (Möller and Rajala, 2007) . In simple terms, there are stable value systems with wellknown and well-specified patterns of activities and resources; one the other hand, there are emerging value systems characterized by radical changes and inherent uncertainty. In between these two polar types, there are renewal value systems producing incremental local changes in existing value systems. These are clearly ideal types and some actors can be involved simultaneously in all of them. Based on their work on this framework, Möller and his colleagues have clearly shown that management tasks are different in each of these types of networked value-creation.
To sum up, there are several contingencies that determine the task environment for network management, and these contingent factors are related to the characteristics of the network. An apparent question is how the contingencies identified in the extant literature are interrelated. In other words, we need a theory explicating the joint influence of contingencies on network management. So far the proposition by Möller and his collegues, the level of determination of the value-system underlying a network, seems most promising. It links together the goal a network tries to achieve, and the tasks, activities, resources and actors involved. As a highly abstract notion it needs further articulation though.
In each different network actors may try to achieve different roles of network management. This depends on the characteristics, for instance resources and capabilities, of these actors; this is the role-level of network management that we will briefly discuss next.
Role-level contingencies: actors and their characteristics -Level One
Whereas network characteristics determine the required management tasks in each network, we argue that the characteristics of the actors determine the roles each actor may take in managing the network. Based on our literature review, we suggest that these roles are fundamentally related to the resources and capabilities of the actors.
For instance, Snow, Miles and Coleman (1992) define three managerial roles: architect, lead operator, and caretaker. Knight and Harland (2005) identify six roles (advisor, information broker, network structuring agent, innovation facilitator, coordinator, and supply policy maker), partly overlapping with the roles identified by Snow, Miles and Coleman (1992) . Recently, Heikkinen et al. (2007) have studied mobile service development nets and identified in them twelve distinct roles of managing: webber, gatekeeper, instigator, advocate, producer, entrant, planner, auxiliary, facilitator, aspirant, compromiser, and accessory provider. The purpose of this paper is not to review these network management roles more thoroughly. It seems that we still need more studies of these roles and their contingencies. The limited literature suggests two possible routes forward. One is to continue conducting empirically oriented studies where the context specific roles are indentified. This will provide further information on the richness of roles and their context dependence. The other possibility is to try to identify possible generic or "meta" roles which would be present in most networks, but with varying characteristics. These approaches can, of course, support each other.
Based on these studies it seems clear that network management roles are context-dependent, that is dependent on the characteristics of the specific studied networks, and that certain actors can take on certain roles only if they possess the appropriate resources and capabilities. The point we are stressing here (at level TD1) is that only based on their resources and capabilities can certain actors adopt one or several network roles to handle the network management tasks required in a certain network.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have reviewed intra-and inter-organizational management, made connections between them, and presented a metatheoretical contingency framework of network management. This framework outlines the origins of certain powers of management (the ability to control, to ability to elicit cooperation, and the drive towards efficiency and effectiveness) deriving from our socio-economical institutional and industrial contexts; the requirements for network management in all kinds of networks and the related network management functions (framing, activating, mobilizing, and synthesizing); how different types of networks require different managerial tasks; and how the characteristics of actors empower them to take on different management roles within their networks. Most importantly, the framework shows how these levels of network management are contingent upon each other.
This framework is an abstract, metatheoretical tool to understand network management. Our intention is not to say that there is a "grand theory" of network management that every researcher and manager should follow. Rather we emphasize, much in line with Tsoukas (1994) , that each level of the framework constitutes a separate and interesting layer of research. Accordingly, our framework will not make previous studies of network management useless. On the contrary, we believe that the framework will open up new possibilities to synthesize and utilize the earlier studies, and to connect them to form stronger research designs in the future studies of network management.
A cle ar im plication of our framework is that it is fundamentally usele ss to argue that networks cannot be managed. Networks are being managed, all the time. The management consists of a complex pattern of managerial activities -be they conscious or unconscious, strategic or non-strategic -of framing, activating, mobilizing, and synthesizing. If these activities did not exist, we would not be able to witness any functioning value-creating networks.
However, we agree that the extent to which networks can be managed is different from one network to the other. This difference is especially evident between intentionally created and maintained strategic networks versus more emergent "markets-as-networks" types of networks. The different extent to which networks can be managed thus is contingent upon the characteristics of the networks, especially on their relative closure. The key point is that in all networks there exists at least some level of framing, activating, mobilizing, and synthesizing. To be sure, in markets-as-networks managing is more coping in the networks, whereas in strategic networks we can conceive the management of networks in a more strong sense.
One question still remains: how are network management capabilities and mechanisms related to the framework presented in this paper? We suggest that we can study and distinguish different types of management capabilities and mechanisms at each level of the framework. With the existing knowledge base we are also able to make propositions about the potential, and even effective, combinations of these. Thus it is likely that we can identify different function-level management capabilities and mechanisms for networks, markets, and hierarchies. Likewise it is likely that each different network requires different task-level capabilities and mechanisms, as well as different actorlevel capabilities and management mechanisms under actors' control empower different network management roles.
We recognize the abstract and complex nature of the proposed contingency framework. There are several propositions that are tentative and require more work. In this respect we would like to invite comments and criticism towards our network management proposals. In sum, we hope that the paper will encourage research and more rigorous research designs on network management.
